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Abstract:  
Research aims: This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance, 
specifically relating to the ownership structure and board structure, on the 
possibility of financial distress. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The sample used in this study are companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2015 to 2019, excluding the 
financial industry. Conditional logistic regression is used as the study uses paired 
data based on the total assets of the company. 
Research findings: The results of this study indicate that board ownership, 
independent commissioners, and the board of directors can increase the 
likelihood of financial distress. On the other hand, institutional ownership and 
concentrated ownership are proven to have no effect on the likelihood of 
financial distress. The results of sensitivity testing using logistic regression 
showed different results on the variable institutional ownership, which is that 
institutional ownership can increase the likelihood of financial distress. 
Meanwhile, the other variables showed the same outcome as the main 
regression used in this study. 
Theoretical contribution/Originality: This study contributes to the knowledge on 
the relationship of board ownership, institutional ownership, concentrated 
ownership, independent commissioners and board size and the possibility of 
financial distress. Also, this research found that the provision of incentives in the 
form of shares to the board may not be an effective way to overcome financial 
distress in Indonesian firms. 
Keywords: Financial Distress; Corporate Governance; Ownership Structure; Board 
Structure 
Introduction 
The monetary crisis that hit Asia in 1997 to 1998 was an extraordinary 
event that resulted in many companies experiencing financial distress 
(Helena & Saifi, 2018). The Asian Development Bank [ADB] (2000) stated 
that one of the main sources that caused a huge economic downturn in 
Indonesia was the weak corporate governance structure of Indonesian 
companies. This propelled the Indonesian government to establish a 
committee called Komite Nasional Kebijakan Corporate Governance 
(KNKCG) or National Committee on Good Corporate Governance in 1999 
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in hopes that Indonesian companies can implement better corporate governance 
(Otoritas Jasa Keuangan [OJK], 2014). However, today, weak implementation of corporate 
governance is still a recurring source of problems that can lead to a company’s failure. 
One example is the case of PT Asuransi Jiwasraya, which is one of the state-owned 
enterprises in Indonesia, that failed to pay its customers’ insurance claims amounting to 
Rp802 billion in 2018 (CNN Indonesia, 2020). Kompasiana (2021) stated that Jiwasraya 
failed to apply three main principles of good corporate governance. First is transparency, 
because the company did not present their financial statements objectively and did not 
display its actual figures, which can be seen from the audit done by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2017, who corrected Jiwasraya’s previous income of Rp2.4 
trillion to Rp428 billion. There is also accountability and responsibility, which was violated 
because the company invested in risky assets, causing them to be unable to fulfill their 
insurance claim obligations (Kompasiana, 2021). From this case, it can be seen how 
important it is for companies to implement good corporate governance as a mechanism 
for controlling and managing the company (Kholis, 2015). 
 
Kaen (2003) stated that corporate governance is about who controls the company and 
why control must be carried out. The word "who" refers to a company's shareholders, the 
board of commissioners, the board of directors, creditors, and other related parties in the 
company, while "why" is because there are conflicts of interests between these parties 
which can lead to asymmetric information and harm the company. This conflict of interest 
can lead to wrong decision making by management which leads to financial distress 
(Cinantya & Merkusiwati, 2015). 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) stated that concentrated ownership is one of the corporate 
governance variables that can help companies minimize the possibility of financial 
distress. This is because shareholders will get incentives in return for maximizing firm 
value and reducing information asymmetry through monitoring opportunistic 
management behavior, thus avoiding financial distress (Claessens, Djankov, & Klapper, 
2003; Deng & Wang, 2006). However, Jensen (1993) and Younas et al. (2021) said that 
concentrated ownership can lead to information asymmetry, monopolistic decision-
making and hinder the management from running the company, thereby increasing the 
possibility of financial distress. 
 
According to Manzaneque, Priego, and Merino (2016) another corporate governance 
mechanism that can affect the probability of financial distress is institutional ownership, 
which are financial institutions that have shares in the company. Cinantya and 
Merkusiwati (2015), Helena and Saifi (2018) and Li, Crook, Andreeva and Tang (2020) 
found that institutional parties have expertise in detecting companies that are eligible for 
investment and the ability to supervise management in carrying out company activities 
and detect potential risks, so they can help reduce the possibility of financial distress. 
However, Donker, Santen, and Zahir (2009) argue that institutional investors will act 
passively because most times they also provide financial services to the companies they 
have ownership in, and so they do not want to oppose the management in fear of 
damaging business relationships. 
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Board ownership can also reduce the likelihood of financial distress (Miglani, Ahmed & 
Henry, 2015; Salloum, Schmitt & Bouri, 2013). Board ownership can make the board 
members’ goals align with the goals of other shareholders, which is the long-term 
performance of the company (Donker at al., 2009). Therefore, the board members will 
feel compelled to supervise and lead the management properly so that the company's 
performance increases, which prevents financial distress (Li et al., 2020; Manzaneque et 
al., 2016; Miglani et al., 2015). However, Wang and Deng (2006) and Hui and Jing-jing 
(2008) argue that large board ownership can be used for personal welfare which in turn, 
harms the company. In addition, Bodroastuti (2009), and Cinantya and Merkusiwati 
(2015) say that share ownership by the company's board does not have an impact on the 
possibility of financial distress because sometimes the board only have a small or 
insignificant amount of the company’s shares, so it does not provide an incentive to lead 
and supervise management. 
 
The corporate board structure can also be used to address agency problems (Manzaneque 
et al., 2016). Previous research found that the proportion of independent commissioners 
can reduce the possibility of financial distress because one of the board of commissioners’ 
duty is to control the potential for opportunism made by management, hence this can 
reduce agency problems (Freitas Cardoso, Peixoto, & Barboza, 2019; Hui & Jing-jing, 2008; 
Li et al., 2020; Manzaneque et al., 2016; Salloum et al., 2013). However, Cinantya and 
Merkusiwati (2015) and Miglani et al. (2015) found that the number of independent 
commissioners can actually increase the possibility of financial distress because often 
times, independent commissioners have a lack of independence, so the monitoring of the 
performance and behavior of company’s management becomes weak. This will result in 
an increase in agency problems and may result in financial distress. 
 
In their research, Bodroastuti (2009) and Manzaneque et al. (2016) found that the board 
of directors can reduce the likelihood of financial distress. A large board of director size 
can help to monitor a more optimal financial reporting process (Bodroastuti, 2009; 
Manzaneque et al., 2016). However, Helena and Saifi (2018) and Salloum et al. (2013) 
found that a larger board of director size can actually increase the possibility of financial 
distress. This is because a size that is too large can actually make communication and 
coordination less effective, so that the company's decision making becomes less optimal 
(Helena & Saifi, 2018). 
 
This study follows previous research by Manzaneque et al. (2016) conducted in Spain 
regarding the effect of corporate governance on the possibility of financial distress. The 
difference in application of corporate governance, legal systems, and different codes of 
ethics in each country causes contradictions in the results obtained by several 
researchers, therefore it is important to investigate this further in different countries 
(Manzaneque et al., 2016). Another thing that makes this research interesting is the 
measurement of financial distress used by Manzaneque et al. (2016), which follows the 
ex-ante model by Pindado, Rodrigues, and de la Torre (2008). The ex-ante method, which 
can be used as an early warning for companies, is found to be more effective compared 
to the bankruptcy prediction model that was previously widely used (Farooq, Jibran 
Qamar & Haque, 2018). Unlike bankruptcy, the definition of financial distress itself is not 
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something that can be determined legally, so the application of this ex-ante model can be 
generalized to different industries and countries (Farooq et al., 2018; Pindado at al., 
2008).  
 
Through this ex-ante model, this research wants to address the ongoing issue regarding 
the weak implementation of corporate governance in Indonesian firms, such as the case 
of Jiwasraya, despite having KNKCG since 1999. Therefore, this becomes the motivation 
of this research to discover which implementation of good corporate governance can help 
companies reduce the possibility of financial distress in Indonesia. This study uses a 
sample of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in the 2015-2019 
period.  
 
More than that, this research is expected to provide benefits to the academic world by 
adding and being a reference for further research regarding board and ownership 
structure in overcoming and preventing the possibility of financial distress. This study can 
also help company’s management in evaluating their implementation of corporate 
governance to help minimize the possibility of financial distress. Lastly, this can aid 
investors in examining which company to invest by considering their implementation of 
corporate governance. 
 
This research is divided into five parts, first the introduction, which consists of the 
background, problem formulation, objectives, and benefits. Second, the literature review 
and hypothesis development which is then followed by the research methods used. After 
that, the results and discussion of the results are given, alongside with the results from 
the sensitivity test. The last section of this research shows the conclusions, limitations, 
suggestions, and implications of this study. 
 
 




According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory explains about the relationship 
between two parties referred to as principal and agent. The principal assigns tasks and 
delegates the agent to make the best decision in the principal’s favor. However, 
sometimes the agent does not always act in the interests of the principal, and this is what 
is known as the agency problem. Generally, the principal monitors and provides incentives 
or special rewards to agents. The costs incurred to minimize agency problems are referred 
to as agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) said that agency costs are the 
accumulation of 3 costs, namely monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss. In a 
company, shareholders are the principal, while management is the agent who should act 
in the interests of the shareholders. However, it is not uncommon for management to 
prioritize their own interests, therefore it is necessary to implement good corporate 
governance in order to minimize agency problems (Dwiridotjahjono, 2009). Bonazzi and 
Islam (2007) said that building an effective board structure is important in implementing 
corporate governance because it helps minimize the possibility of management acting in 
their own interests, thus minimizing agency problems. 
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Resource Dependency Theory 
 
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) was introduced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). This 
theory focuses on the importance of external relations for a company to have in order to 
obtain sufficient resources for the survival of the company. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
stated that when an organization appoints a board of directors, there is an expectation 
that the board of directors will support, involve themselves in the problems that exist and 
help the organization. The structure of the board of directors, such as the number of 
boards of directors and the number of foreign directors, can have a good influence in 
identifying problems, evaluating strategies, giving advice and creating relationships with 
the external environment (Singh, 2007). Therefore, a large board of directors is expected 
to be able to provide solutions, information and wider resources so to overcome company 
problems and improve the company’s performance which will minimize the possibility of 
companies experiencing financial distress (Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Widhiastuti, Nurkhin 
& Susilowati, 2019; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
 
The Effect of Board Ownership on the Likelihood of Financial Distress 
 
Li et al. (2020), Miglani et al. (2015), and Manzaneque et al. (2016) found that board 
ownership has the potential to reduce agency problems and the possibility of financial 
distress. In the company, the board has a significant role in determining the strategy to 
achieve the company's goals (Tarigan & Hadiprajitno, 2018). In general, a board that owns 
shares in a company will have the same goals as other shareholders as they will have an 
incentive to further monitor the performance of the company’s management and ensure 
operational activities run well (Budiarti & Sulistyowati, 2016; Hastuti, 2014). Ownership 
owned by the board can make them feel the same risks and responsibilities as other 
shareholders, so the board will be motivated to reduce the potential for financial distress. 
Thus, board ownership will greatly affect the company's financial performance and lessen 
the probability of financial distress (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
On the other hand, Wardhani (2007) and Kirana (2018) found that board ownership can 
increase the likelihood of financial distress. According to Wardhani (2007), one of the 
reasons why the ownership of shares by the board of commissioners and the board of 
directors can increase the possibility of financial distress is because the board tends to 
carry out expropriation actions through decisions or voting rights that they own, which 
can harm the company. Kirana (2018) also found that the control rights owned by the 
board of commissioners and directors can be used to involve rules that deviate from good 
corporate governance practices as a tool to maintain their careers even though they are 
no longer competent. 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), board ownership can increase the value of the 
company and reduce the possibility of financial distress. Board ownership is one example 
of what Jensen and Meckling (1976) call bonding costs and monitoring costs, therefore, 
following the agency cost by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the hypotheses to be studied 
is: 
 
H1: Board ownership can reduce the likelihood of financial distress. 
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The Effect of Institutional Ownership on the Likelihood of Financial Distress 
 
Helena and Saifi (2018) and Younas et al. (2021) found that companies with large 
institutional ownership can avoid financial distress. Li et al. (2020) explains that the 
presence of institutional investors will reduce the possibility of financial distress to occur 
because institutional investors have the expertise and ability to detect companies that are 
eligible for investment, so companies with large institutional ownership will be trusted to 
have better performance. Claessens and Djankov (1999) in their research in the Czech 
Republic, said that a company owned by a bank would be valued higher because it can 
carry out a good monitoring function and is trusted not to expropriate the company's 
assets and can more easily provide an injection of funds to the company. According to 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), large institutional ownership will have a stronger voice to 
encourage monitoring activities of investment developments. Thus, with large 
institutional ownership, it is hoped that they can contribute to controlling and monitoring 
the behavior of company management and reducing agency problems so the potential of 
financial distress can be further suppressed. 
 
Contrarily, Donker et al. (2009) argued that institutional investors have a passive nature 
in carrying out supervisory activities on company management. This is because 
institutional investors often also provide financial services to the companies they own, so 
they are believed to not oppose the company’s management in fear of damaging their 
business relationship. Passive supervision can lead to agency problems or decision making 
that are detrimental to the company, and this will increase the potential for financial 
distress to happen (Pramudena, 2017). 
 
Based on the agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976) regarding monitoring costs, 
supervisory acts by institutional investors can help companies reduce agency problems. 
Therefore, following the agency theory, the second hypotheses to be studied is: 
 
H2: Institutional ownership can reduce the likelihood of financial distress. 
 
 
The Effect of Concentrated Ownership on the Likelihood of Financial Distress 
 
Companies with concentrated ownership will be followed by high controlling rights by the 
controlling shareholder, where this controlling right can affect the company's 
performance and minimize the possibility of the company experiencing financial distress 
(Wang & Deng, 2006; Mariano, Izadi & Pratt, 2021). In the situation of company failure, 
the controlling shareholders will suffer huge losses due to their participation in the 
company. Thus, controlling shareholders will monitor management behavior to prevent 
opportunism, or in other words, controlling shareholders have incentives to monitor 
management and prevent conflicts of interest that can cause harm to the company 
(Mariano et al., 2021). 
 
On the other hand, Tarigan and Hadiprajitno (2018) and Younas et al. (2021) found that 
concentrated ownership can increase the likelihood of financial distress because it can 
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lead to monopolistic decision making and can reduce the independence of the company. 
In addition, Jensen (1993) also said that concentrated ownership can lead to information 
asymmetry between majority and minority shareholders, thereby increasing the 
probability of financial distress. The party with the largest ownership can use their power 
to influence the management and use it for their own benefit, which in turn can harm 
minority shareholders and increase the likelihood of financial distress (La Porta et al., 
2000; Lee & Yeh, 2004). 
 
Based on the research by Wang and Deng (2006) and Mariano et al. (2021), controlling 
shareholders will have more incentives to monitor management behavior because their 
participation or investment in the company is quite significant. In accordance with the 
agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the supervision carried out by the 
controlling shareholder is an example of monitoring cost. Therefore, following the agency 
theory, the third hypotheses to be studied is: 
 
H3: Concentrated ownership can reduce the likelihood of financial distress. 
 
 
The Effect of Independent Commissioner on the Likelihood of Financial Distress 
 
Freitas Cardoso et al. (2019), Li et al. (2020), Wang and Deng (2006), Hui and Jing-jing 
(2008) and Salloum et al. (2013) found that the proportion of independent commissioners 
can reduce the possibility of financial distress. This is because the independent 
commissioner plays a role in controlling the potential for opportunism and preventing 
managers from making decisions that can harm shareholders, so with the presence of an 
independent commissioner, agency problems will be reduced (Li et al., 2020). 
 
On the other hand, Cinantya and Merkusiwati (2015) and Miglani et al. (2015) found that 
independent commissioners can actually increase the likelihood of financial distress. This 
happens because sometimes independent commissioners have a lack of independence, 
so their monitoring and advisory roles are not optimal and can lead to financial distress. 
 
Based on Subrata (2020), the role of independent commissioners is to reduce risk and 
increase shareholder’s welfare. This independent commissioner's supervision is an 
example of the agency theory proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), namely 
monitoring cost. Therefore, following the theory, the hypotheses to be studied is: 
 
H4: Independent commissioners can reduce the likelihood of financial distress. 
 
 
The Effect of Board Size on the Likelihood of Financial Distress 
 
Helena and Saifi (2018) and Salloum et al. (2013) found that the possibility of financial 
distress will increase if the size of the board is larger because it can increase 
communication and coordination problems within the board. Younas et al. (2021) also 
stated that a large board size can slow down the decision-making process, so this can 
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reduce the board’s ability and effectiveness to manage the company and result in 
deteriorating company performance which can lead to financial distress. 
 
However, Bodroastuti (2009), Manzaneque et al. (2016) and Mariano et al. (2021) found 
that a large board size can reduce the potential for financial distress. According to 
Manzaneque et al. (2016) and Mariano et al. (2021), a greater number of board members 
will be able to provide greater benefits and have wider connections to provide more 
resources to help the company. 
 
This statement is in accordance with the resource dependence theory developed by 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) which implies that a larger board size can provide more 
benefits and advantages to the company, especially during difficult times. Therefore, 
following the resource dependence theory by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the hypotheses 
to be studied is: 
 





Figure 1 shows a research framework consisting of one dependent variable, five 
independent variables and three control variables. 
 
 
Figure 1 Theoretical Framework 
 
The dependent variable of this study is a dummy variable, where ‘1’ denotes companies 
that are in financial distress, while healthy companies are categorized as ‘0’. The 
independent variables of this study are board ownership, institutional ownership, 
concentrated ownership, independent commissioner, and board size while the control 
variables are profitability, financial expense, and retained earnings. 
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Research Method 
 
Population and Sample 
 
This study uses all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from recent 
years from 2015 to 2019, except companies in the financial industry because of the 
different regulations governing companies in the financial industry. Samples were taken 
using the match-pair method to control the size of companies that could cause bias. The 
data source of this research is the annual report published on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX), data obtained from www.idx.co.id, the company's website and data from 
the Capital IQ database. The first stage of sampling is done by obtaining data from the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), which contains 728 companies or equal to 3,640 
observations. Among the 728 companies, 110 companies operate in the financial industry, 
so they were excluded. Furthermore, there were 249 companies that did not have 
complete data in their annual reports and/or financial statements during 2015 to 2019, 
so they were also eliminated. Finally, the data that has been obtained will be categorized 
as financially distressed or healthy and paired within the same industry category and 
period. Companies that do not have a suitable pair will be excluded from the sample. 
Overall, the research sample obtained is 344 companies or 990 observations. Of the 990 
observations, 495 of them are companies with financial distress category and the other 
495 observations are companies with healthy categories. 
 
Variable Measurement and Operation 
 
The dependent variable in this study is financial distress, in the form of a dummy variable, 
where ‘1’ denotes a company in financial distress and ‘0’ means that the company is 
considered financially healthy. The measurement of financial distress used in this study 
follows the measurement created by Pindado et al. (2008), hence the companies in this 
research sample will be categorized as financially distressed if they meet one of the 
following two conditions: (1) financial expense is greater than EBITDA for two consecutive 
years and/or (2) there is a decline in the market value in two consecutive periods. The 
EBITDA and financial expense used are financial data for years t-2 and t-1. Meanwhile, the 
market value used is the market value at the end of year t-3, t-2, and t-1 to determine the 
condition of the company in year t, which is obtained through Capital IQ. 
 
The independent variables in this study are categorized into two main categories which 
are ownership structure and board structure. The variables that define ownership 
structure are board ownership, institutional ownership, and concentrated ownership. 
Meanwhile, the company's board structure consists of independent commissioners and 
board of directors. 
 
Board ownership is measured using the percentage of shares owned by the board of 
directors and board of commissioners in the company to the number of shares in the 
company. The formula used is as follows: 
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This measurement method follows the measurements used by a number of previous 
studies (Bodroastuti, 2009; Cinantya & Merkusiwati, 2015; Wang & Deng, 2006; Hastuti, 
2014; and Manzaneque et al., 2016). 
 
Institutional ownership is measured using the percentage of shares owned by an 






This measurement is in accordance with that used by Bodroastuti (2009); Cinantya and 
Merkusiwati (2015); Helena and Saifi (2018); Li et al. (2020); Manzaneque et al. (2016); 
Udin, Khan, and Javid (2017); Younas et al. (2021). 
 
Concentrated ownership is measured using the percentage of shares owned by the largest 
shareholder in the company. Following Manzaneque et al. (2016), Miglani et al. (2015) 






The variable independent commissioners are measured using the proportion of 
independent commissioners divided by the total number of members of the company's 
board of commissioners. The measurements used follow several previous studies 






The board of directors is measured using the number of members of the board of 






This measurement follows the research of Bodroastuti (2009); Freitas Cardoso et al. 
(2019); Helena and Saif (2018); Manzaneque et al. (2016); Rahmawati and Hadiprajitno 
(2015). 
 
This study also uses three control variables, which are profitability, financial expense and 
retained earnings. Profitability is measured using Return on Assets (ROA). This ratio 
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measures the company's ability to manage its assets efficiently to generate net income to 
meet its financial obligations, so the higher the net profit, the less likely it is the company 
to encounter financial distress (Pindado et al., 2008). Following previous research by 






Financial Expense is measured by dividing financial expenses with the total assets at the 
beginning of the year (Manzaneque et al., 2016; Pindado et al., 2008) found that financial 
expense has a significant impact on the probability of financial distress. If the financial 
expense is greater, then the possibility of the company to experience financial distress 
increases. Therefore, based on the research of Pindado et al. (2008), the Financial Expense 






To predict future net income and self-financing capacity, this study will use Retained 







This measurement follows Manzaneque et al. (2016) and Pindado et al. (2008) who found 











Where β0 is the constant and β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8 β9 is the Regression Coefficient. FD is 
the dependent variable which stands for financial distress (measured using a dummy, 1 if 
it is classified as financially distressed and0 if it is classified as healthy). The independent 
variables are BOARDOWN, which is the percentage of board ownership, INSOWN, the 
percentage of institutional ownership, CONOWN, the percentage of concentrated 
ownership, IND is the proportion of independent commissioners in the company, and 
BSIZE is the number of board of directors in the company. For the control variable, return 
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on asset (ROA) is measured by profit before tax and interest divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year, FE is financial expense, measured by interest expense divided by 
total assets at the beginning of the year, and lastly, retained earnings (RE) is measured by 
RE at the beginning of the year divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. i 
denotes the company number, t means the year of t, t-1 means year before t, and Ɛ means 
error. 
This study uses conditional logistic regression method for paired subjects, which means 
that each company that is classified as financially distressed (Y=1) is paired with a 
company that is classified as healthy (Y=0). The assumption used in logistic conditional 
regression is that the variables do not have to be normally distributed, therefore do not 
require heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation tests because they have different 
characteristics from linear regression. However, to find out whether the independent 
variables are correlated with each other, a multicollinearity test is conducted. This study 
also uses a sensitivity test to compare the consistency results of hypothesis testing with 
different methods by using logistic regression. In the logistic regression method, the 
match-pair method is not used. 
Result and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Data adjustment is done by changing the outliers using the calculation of the mean plus 
or minus three standard deviations to find the upper and lower limits (Leys et al., 2013). 
Following the empirical rule, normal distribution in the form of a bell-shape or normally 
distributed data is spread over plus and minus three standard deviations from the average 
or about 99.7% of observations. Therefore, data that are outside the normality 
are categorized as outliers (Lind, Marchal, & Wathen, 1999). Table 1 and 2 show 
the Descriptive Statistics after and before treatment, respectively. 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
FD 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Independent Variable 
BOARDOWN 0.055 0.137 0.000 0.953 
INSOWN 0.123 0.202 0.000 0.897 
CONOWN 0.521 0.217 0.044 0.976 
IND 0.411 0.112 0.000 1.000 
BSIZE 4.816 1.957 2.000 16.000 
Control Variable 
ROA 0.045 0.120 -0.709 0.832 
FE 0.026 0.047 0.000 0.844 
RE -0.267 3.159 -75.099 1.058 
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Note:  
Number of observation = 990 companies; FD = financial distress (measured using a dummy code 1 
if it is classified as financial distress and code 0 if it is classified as healthy); BOARDOWN = % board 
ownership; INSOWN = institutional ownership; CONOWN = concentrated ownership; IND = 
independent commissioner; BSIZE = board of directors; ROA = profit before tax and interest / total 
assets at the beginning of the year; FE = interest expense / total assets at the beginning of the year; 
RE = Retained earnings at the beginning of the year / total assets at the beginning of the year. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics After Treatment 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
FD 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Independent Variable 
BOARDOWN 0.053 0.126 0.000 0.683 
INSOWN 0.121 0.198 0.000 0.869 
CONOWN 0.520 0.217 0.044 0.976 
IND 0.409 0.104 0.167 0.800 
BSIZE 4.794 1.862 2.000 1.000 
Control Variable 
ROA 0.045 0.109 -0.454 0.569 
FE 0.024 0.023 0.000 0.166 
RE -0.126 1.401 -12.783 1.058 
Notes:  
Number of observation = 990 companies; FD = financial distress (measured using a dummy code 1 
if it is classified as financial distress and code 0 if it is classified as healthy); BOARDOWN = % board 
ownership; INSOWN = institutional ownership; CONOWN = concentrated ownership; IND = 
independent commissioner; BSIZE = board of directors; ROA = profit before tax and interest / total 
assets at the beginning of the year; FE = interest expense / total assets at the beginning of the year; 




The correlation matrix is used to examine the multicollinearity between the independent 
variables through the Spearman’s rho correlations shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
 BOARDOWN INSOWN CONOWN IND BSIZE ROA FE RE 
BOARDOWN 1.00        
INSOWN -0.15 1.00       
CONOWN -0.19 -0.18 1.00      
IND -0.07 0.01 0.07 1.00     
BSIZE -0.016 0.12 0.02 0.01 1.00    
ROA -0.01 -0.07 0.08 0.06 0.17 1.00   
FE 0.03 0.04 -0.13 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 1.00  
RE -0.02 -0.09 0.16 -0.03 0.24 0.50 -0.42 1.00 
Notes: 
BOARDOWN = % board ownership; INSOWN = institutional ownership; CONOWN = concentrated 
ownership; IND = independent commissioner; BSIZE = board of directors; ROA = profit before tax 
and interest / total assets at the beginning of the year; FE = interest expense / total assets at the 
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beginning of the year; RE = Retained earnings at the beginning of the year / total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
 
The result of the correlation matrix shows that all correlations are below 0.4, which shows 




To ensure that the independent variables did not have a linear relationship with each 
other, a multicollinearity test is carried out as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Multicollinearity Test 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
BOARDOWN 1.06 0.943 
INSOWN 1.07 0.938 
CONOWN 1.07 0.937 
IND 1.03 0.976 
BSIZE 1.06 0.947 
ROA 1.14 0.875 
FE 1.28 0.781 
RE 1.39 0.722 
Mean VIF 1.14  
Notes: 
BOARDOWN = % board ownership; INSOWN = institutional ownership; CONOWN = concentrated 
ownership; IND = independent commissioner; BSIZE = board of directors; ROA = profit before tax 
and interest / total assets at the beginning of the year; FE = interest expense / total assets at the 
beginning of the year; RE = Retained earnings at the beginning of the year / total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
 
The results of the multicollinearity test show that all independent variables have a VIF 
value that does not exceed 10 and a tolerance value above 0.1. Therefore, the 
independent variables in this study are free from multicollinearity symptoms. 
 
Coefficient of Determination Test (McFadden R2) 
 
Coefficient of determination test is conducted to see how much the independent variable 
can explain the dependent variable itself. The test results show the value of McFadden R2 
of 0.213 or 21.30%. This figure shows that the dependent variable, namely financial 
distress, can be explained by the independent variable by 21.30%. In his research, 
Hensher and Stopher (1977) stated that the range of McFadden R2 values between 0.2 to 
0.4 for regression models other than ordinary least squares is an excellent fit. Therefore, 
the value of McFadden R2 in this study is included in the very good category or can be said 
to have a model that is already fit. 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
The likelihood ratio test aims to see the effect of the variables used on the regression 
model. The model was tested by comparing the model with complete independent 
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variables (m1) with the model without incomplete independent variables (m2). The null 
hypothesis in this test is that the independent variable has no effect on the dependent 
variable simultaneously. If the prob value > chi2 resulting from this test does not exceed 
the alpha value, then the null hypothesis will be rejected.  
 
The likelihood ratio test shows the chi-square value of 0.000, this number is lower than 
the alpha value of 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, or that the independent 




The Wald test is conducted to see whether the independent variables in the model have 
an influence on the regression model used (Stephanie, 2016). In Wald's test, the null 
hypothesis is the independent variable that has no significant effect on the dependent 
variable. If the p-value or prob > chi2 is greater than 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
The results show that the value of prob > chi2 is smaller than alpha 0.05, which is 0.0003. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, which means that the independent variable in 
this study has a significant effect on the dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis Test Results and Discussion 
 
The results of hypotheses testing are shown in Table 5. It is found that board ownership 
can increase the possibility of the company experiencing financial distress. In Table 2, 
regarding the descriptive sample of this study, it can be seen that the ownership of the 
board of commissioners and the board of directors in this research sample has a fairly low 
average, which is 5.3%. This finding is in line with research done by Putri et al. (2017) 
which shows that low ownership can reduce the board’s motivation in carrying out their 
roles optimally to monitor the management activities due to lack of incentives or 
encouragement. Therefore, this can increase opportunistic actions that can be done by 
management. 
 
Table 5 Results of Conditional Logistics Regression Hypothesis Testing 
FD Coef. Std. Err. Z P > | z | 
Two-Tailed 
P > | z | 
One-Tailed 
Conclusion 
BOARDOWN 0.837 0.613 1.37 0.172 0.086* Not supported 
INSOWN 0.091 0.384 0.24 0.811 0.406 Not supported 
CONOWN -0.044 0.365 -
0.12 
0.903 0.452 Not supported 
IND 1.158 0.733 1.58 0.115 0.058* Not supported 
BSIZE 0.132 0.045 2.89 0.004 0.002*** Not supported 
ROA -8.982 1.019 -
8.81 
0.000 0.000*** Supported 
FE 6.826 4.140 1.65 0.099 0.050** Supported 
RE -0.081 0.076 -
1.07 
0.285 0.143 Not supported 
Notes: 
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively; BOARDOWN = % board ownership; INSOWN 
= institutional ownership; CONOWN = concentrated ownership; IND = independent commissioner; 
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BSIZE = board of directors; ROA = profit before tax and interest / total assets at the beginning of 
the year; FE = interest expense / total assets at the beginning of the year; RE = Retained earnings 
at the beginning of the year / total assets at the beginning of the year. 
 
The next variable, institutional ownership, has no effect on the possibility of financial 
distress. This finding is in line with research by Bodroastuti (2009), Manzaneque et al. 
(2016), Paramastri and Hadiprajitno (2017) and Udin et al. (2017) which says that 
sometimes institutional investors do not carry out strict and effective monitoring, so the 
presence of institutional investors is only passive. Passive nature arises because 
institutional investors do not have sufficient incentives or authority to improve company 
performance, so this will increase the possibility of management making decisions that 
benefit themselves and increase the probability of financial distress (Manzaneque et al., 
2016; Sunarwijaya, 2017; Udin et al., 2017). 
 
Like institutional ownership, concentrated ownership is also found to not have an effect 
on the possibility of the company experiencing financial distress. This finding is in line with 
the results from Hui and Jing-jing (2008), Manzaneque et al. (2016), Nitami (2020), 
Paramastri and Hadiprajitno (2017), and Lee and Yeh (2004) who said that sometimes 
controlling shareholders do not have the ability to carry out the supervisory and control 
functions of company activities and result in inappropriate decisions taken by 
management (Nitami, 2020). Manzaneque et al. (2016) also said that controlling 
shareholders have a passive nature so they do not carry out good monitoring of the 
company's management, hence controlling shareholders do not contribute to preventing 
the company from experiencing financial distress. In addition, concentrated ownership 
can lead to information asymmetry between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders as well as reduced transparency in the use of funds (Lee & Yeh, 2004). 
Therefore, this study cannot empirically prove that concentrated ownership will monitor 
management behavior in order to protect its investment and have a significant influence 
in preventing companies from experiencing financial distress. 
 
The regression results also show that independent commissioners can increase the 
likelihood of financial distress. Previous research by Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), 
Cinantya and Merkusiwati (2015), Miglani et al. (2015), and Tabalujan (2002) said that 
sometimes independent commissioners lack independence, so they do not monitor the 
performance of the company’s management well, which can lead an increase of agency 
problem and cause financial distress. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) also state that 
sometimes independent commissioners do not have good experience or knowledge 
related to the industrial sector and the company they hold, so they cannot provide good 
decisions to improve company performance. In addition, companies in Indonesia often 
determine independent commissioners only to fulfill regulations, so they do not carry out 
their functions optimally and do not help to improve company performance and avoid 
financial distress (Tabalujan, 2002). 
 
The results of the fifth hypothesis test indicate that a larger board size can increase the 
likelihood of financial distress. This is similar to the findings of Helena and Saifi (2018), 
Salloum et al. (2013), Siagian (2010), and Younas et al. (2021). A larger board of directors 
usually causes an increase in two main problems, communication and coordination which 
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can slow down the decision-making process (Helena & Saifi, 2018; Salloum et al., 2013; 
Younas et al., 2021). Meanwhile, companies that are in distress will really need big 
decisions and considerations by the board of directors in order to influence the company's 
financial condition (Siagian, 2010). If the board of directors takes too long to coordinate 
and make decisions, it can increase the possibility of the company experiencing financial 
distress (Younas et al., 2021). 
 
The results of testing control variables of profitability show that the higher the 
profitability, the less likely financial distress occurs. Claessens et al. (2003), Pindado et al. 
(2008) and Utami (2019) say that companies with a high level of profitability usually 
attract investors because the company has a high rate of return on investment and sales 
of high profits. Additionally, tests on the financial expense variable indicate that the 
higher the financial expense, the more likely the company will experience financial 
distress. These results are in accordance with the research of Utami (2019) and Pindado 
et al. (2008). Utami (2019) who said that a company with a high financial expense ratio 
can indicate that the company has a lot of debt to outsiders and tends to have high 
financial risk. 
 
Table 5 shows that retained earnings have no effect on the possibility of financial distress. 
According to Rahmawati and Hadiprajitno (2015), the level of retained earnings does not 
necessarily indicate that the company will experience financial distress. This is because 
some companies use retained earnings for business expansion, so that company assets 
are planted in the form of factories not in bank accounts (Baridwan, 1982). In addition, 
this study found that 106 observations have negative retained earnings values, but still 
included in the category of healthy companies. So, this is not in line with the findings of 
Pindado et al. (2008) which states that there is a negative relationship between retained 




To test the robustness of the results of the hypothesis test, this study conducted a 
sensitivity test using a different method, which is logistic regression (Table 6). The 
difference between logistic regression and conditional logistic regression is that logistic 
regression does not need matching data, so this method uses a wider range of samples. 
 
The sensitivity test shows different results on the INSOWN and CONOWN variables. 
Logistic regression suggests that institutional ownership can increase the likelihood of 
financial distress, while in conditional logistics regression, this variable is found to have 
no effect. Wei et al. (2016) said that institutional ownership can reduce company 
performance because sometimes financial institutions only focus on getting returns and 
are not interested in helping companies make strategic decisions, therefore this can 
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Table 6 Results of Sensitivity Testing 
 Conditional Logistic Regression Logistic Regression  
FD Coef. P > | z | One-Tailed Coef. P > | z | One-Tailed 
BOARDOWN 0.837 0.086* 0.729 0.037** 
INSOWN 0.091 0.406 0.402 0.071* 
CONOWN -0.044 0.452 0.210 0.207 
IND 1.158 0.058* 0.919 0.037** 
BSIZE 0.132 0.002*** 0.103 0.001*** 
ROA -8.982 0.000*** -9.111 0.000*** 
FE 6.826 0.050** 8.613 0.001*** 
RE -0.081 0.143 -0.268 0.247 
Notes: 
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively; BOARDOWN = % board ownership; INSOWN 
= institutional ownership; CONOWN = concentrated ownership; IND = independent commissioner; 
BSIZE = board of directors; ROA = profit before tax and interest / total assets at the beginning of 
the year; FE = interest expense / total assets at the beginning of the year; RE = Retained earnings 
at the beginning of the year / total assets at the beginning of the year. 
 
 
The difference in the results found in the INSOWN variable can occur because in the 
conditional logistic regression method, a lot of samples are eliminated during the 
matching process. In the logistic regression method, it was found that financially 
distressed companies had an average institutional ownership of 13.3%, while healthy 
companies had a lower average institutional ownership of 11.1%. So this implies that 
greater institutional ownership can increase the likelihood of financial distress occurring. 
 
The variable CONOWN or concentrated ownership in logistic regression shows opposite 
coefficient values in comparison to the conditional logistic regression results, which shows 
a positive direction. However, the results show that the effect is not significant on the 
possibility of the company experiencing financial distress, so in the end, it has the same 





This study proves that board ownership can increase the possibility of financial distress 
due to lack of motivation to monitor and take control of the company. Independent 
commissioners are also proven to be able to increase the possibility of financial distress 
due to their lack of independence, thus making their supervision on company’s 
management weak which can increase opportunistic actions that lead to financial 
distress. Also, the size of the board of directors can also increase the likelihood of financial 
distress because a large board of directors can create communication and coordination 
problems. Hence, this can slow down the decision-making process and reduce the 
effectiveness of controlling management. On the other hand, institutional ownership and 
concentrated ownership have no effect on the possibility of financial distress. Institutional 
investors sometimes do not have sufficient authority and incentives to closely monitor 
management behavior, so their presence is passive.  
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Meanwhile, concentrated ownership also does not have the ability to carry out the 
supervisory and control functions of the company's activities and result in inappropriate 
decisions made by management. Overall, this research has implications for several 
parties. First is for the academic world, by contributing to the research literature on the 
structure of board ownership, institutional ownership, concentrated ownership, 
independent commissioners, and the size of the board of directors against possible 
financial distress. Second, for the company’s management, this research found that the 
provision of incentives in the form of shares has not been an effective way to overcome 
financial distress, hence, other methods might be needed, such as internal motivation and 
a supportive work environment. Lastly, for investors, to be more careful in determining 
the company they want to invest in so that they do not only use financial ratios as a 
consideration, but also analyze the implementation of corporate governance in 
overcoming the risk of financial distress. 
 
This study has several limitations, first, this research uses a matching system which is done 
manually using excel and personal considerations, thus, allowing for less accurate 
installation. Therefore, it might be better for further research that uses the matching 
system to focus on certain industries so that the matching process can be more accurate. 
Second, this study uses decrease in market value for two consecutive years as one of the 
methods to measure financial distress. However, the study does not consider other 
factors such as stock split that might decrease the market value. This consideration can 
be done in future research in order to more accurately categorize financially distressed 
firms. Third, there is limited institutional ownership data for the companies studied in 
2015 because some companies have not provided detailed types of shareholders in their 
financial statements for the year 2015. So, it is suggested for future research to use more 
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